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On the Tree Conjecture for the Network Creation Game
Davide Bilò∗ Pascal Lenzner†
Abstract
Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic
point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al. [PODC’03] is the network
creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which buy incident edges for
the price of α per edge to minimize their total distance to all other nodes. The model is
well-studied but still has intriguing open problems. The most famous conjectures state that
the price of anarchy is constant for all α and that for α ≥ n all equilibrium networks are
trees.
We introduce a novel technique for analyzing stable networks for high edge-price α and
employ it to improve on the best known bounds for both conjectures. In particular we show
that for α > 4n− 13 all equilibrium networks must be trees, which implies a constant price
of anarchy for this range of α. Moreover, we also improve the constant upper bound on the
price of anarchy for equilibrium trees.
1 Introduction
Many important networks, e.g. the Internet or social networks, have been created in a decentral-
ized way by selfishly acting agents. Modeling and understanding such networks is an important
challenge for researchers in the fields of Computer Science, Network Science, Economics and
Social Sciences. A significant part of this research focuses on assessing the impact of the agents’
selfish behavior on the overall network quality measured by the price of anarchy [31]. Clearly,
if there is no or little coordination among the egoistic agents, then it cannot be expected that
the obtained networks minimize the social cost. The reason for this is that each agent aims
to improve the network quality for herself while minimizing the spent cost. However, empirical
observations, e.g. the famous small-world phenomenon [9, 29, 39], suggest that selfishly built
networks are indeed very efficient in terms of the overall cost and of the individually perceived
service quality. Thus, it is a main challenge to justify these observations analytically.
A very promising approach towards this justification is to model the creation of a network
as a strategic game which yields networks as equilibrium outcomes and then to investigate the
quality of these networks. For this, a thorough understanding of the structural properties of
such equilibrium networks is the key.
We contribute to this endeavor by providing new insights into the structure of equilibrium
networks for one of the classical models of selfish network creation [23]. In this model, agents
correspond to nodes in a network and can buy costly links to other nodes to minimize their total
distance in the created network. Our insights yield improved bounds on the price of anarchy
and significant progress towards settling the so-called tree conjecture [23, 35].
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1.1 Model and Definitions
We consider the classical network creation game as introduced by Fabrikant et al. [23]. There are
n agents V , which correspond to nodes in a network, who want to create a connected network
among themselves. Each agent selfishly strives for minimizing her cost for creating network
links while maximizing her own connection quality. All edges in the network are undirected and
unweighted and agents can create any incident edge for the price of α > 0, where α is a fixed
parameter of the game. The strategy Su ⊆ V \{u} of an agent u denotes which edges are bought
by this agent, that is, agent u is willing to create (and pay for) all the edges (u, x), for all x ∈ Su.
Let s be the n-dimensional vector of the strategies of all agents. The strategy-vector s induces
an undirected network G(s) = (V,E(s)), where for each edge (u, v) ∈ E(s) we have v ∈ Su or
u ∈ Sv. If v ∈ Su, then we say that agent u is the owner of edge (u, v) or that agent u buys the
edge (u, v), otherwise, if u ∈ Sv, then agent v owns or buys the edge (u, v).1 Since the created
networks will heavily depend on α we emphasize this by writing (G(s), α) instead of G(s). The
cost of an agent u in the network (G(s), α) is the sum of her cost for buying edges, called the
creation cost, and her cost for using the network, called the distance cost, which depends on
agent u’s distances to all other nodes within the network. The cost of u is defined as
cost(G(s), α, u) = α|Su|+ distcost(G(s), u),
where the distance cost is defined as
distcost(G(s), u) =
{∑
w∈V dG(s)(u,w), if G(s) is connected
∞, otherwise.
Here dG(s)(u,w) denotes the length of a shortest path between u and w in the network G(s). We
will mostly omit the reference to the strategy vector, since it is clear that a strategy vector directly
induces a network and vice versa. Moreover, if the network is clear from the context, then we
will also omit the reference to the network, e.g. writing distcost(u) instead of distcost(G, u).
A network (G(s), α) is in pure Nash equilibrium (NE), if no agent can unilaterally change her
strategy to strictly decrease her cost. That is, in a NE network no agent can profit by a strategy
change if all other agents stick to their strategies. Since in a NE network no agent wants to
change the network, we call them stable.
The social cost, denoted cost(G(s), α), of a network (G(s), α) is the sum of the cost of all
agents, that is, cost(G(s), α) =
∑
u∈V cost(G(s), α, u). Let OPTn be the minimum social cost
of a n agent network and let maxNEn be the maximum social cost of any NE network on n
agents. The price of anarchy (PoA) [31] is the maximum over all n of the ratio maxNEnOPTn .
Let G = (V,E) be any undirected connected graph with n vertices. A cut-vertex x of G
is a vertex with the property that G with vertex x removed contains at least two connected
components. We say that G is biconnected if n ≥ 3 and G contains no cut-vertex. A biconnected
component H of G is a maximal induced subgraph of G which is also biconnected. Note that
we rule out trivial biconnected components which contain exactly one edge. Thus, there exist
at least two vertex-disjoint paths between any pair of vertices x, y in a biconnected component
H, which implies that there exists a simple cycle containing x and y.
1.2 Related Work
Network creation games, as defined above, were introduced by Fabrikant et al. [23]. They gave
the first general bound of O(√α) on the PoA and they conjectured that above some constant
edge-price all NE networks are trees. This conjecture, called the tree conjecture, is especially
1No edge can have two owners in any equilibrium network. Hence, we will assume throughout the paper that
each edge in E(s) has a unique owner.
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interesting since they also showed that tree networks in NE have constant PoA. In particular,
they proved that the PoA of stable tree networks is at most 5. Interestingly, the tree conjecture
in its general version was later disproved by Albers et al. [1]. However, non-tree NE networks
are known only when α < n, in particular, for every ε > 0, there exist non-tree NE networks
with α ≤ n− ε [35]. It is believed that for α ≥ n the tree conjecture may be true. Settling this
claim is currently a major open problem and there has been a series of papers which improved
bounds concerning the tree conjecture.
First, Albers et al. [1] proved that for α ≥ 12n log n every NE network is a tree. Then, using
a technique based on the average degree of the biconnected component, this was significantly
improved to α > 273n by Mihalák & Schlegel [38] and even further to α ≥ 65n by Mamageishvili
et al. [35]. The main idea of this average degree technique is to prove a lower and an upper bound
on the average degree of the unique biconnected component in any equilibrium network. The
lower bound has the form "for α > c1n the average degree is at least c2" and the upper bound has
the form "for α > c3n the average degree is at most f(α)", where c1, c2, c3 are constants and f is
a function which monotonically decreases in α. For large enough α both bounds contradict each
other, which proves that equilibrium networks for this α cannot have a biconnected component
and thus must be trees. Very recently a preprint by Àlvarez & Messegué [5] was announced
which invokes the average degree technique with a stronger lower bound. This then yields a
contradiction already for α > 17n. For their stronger lower bound the authors use that in every
minimal cycle (we call them "min cycles") of an equilibrium network all agents in the cycle buy
exactly one edge of the cycle. This fact has been independently established by us [34] and we
also use it.
The currently best general upper bound of 2O(
√
logn) on the PoA is due to Demaine et al. [21]
and it is known that the PoA is constant if α < n1− for any fixed  ≥ 1logn [21]. Thus, the
PoA was shown to be constant for almost all α, except for the range between n1−, for any fixed
 ≥ 1logn , and α < 65n (or α ≤ 9n which is claimed in [5]). It is widely conjectured that the PoA
is constant for all α and settling this open question is a long standing problem in the field. A
constant PoA proves that agents create socially close-to-optimal networks even without central
coordination. Quite recently, a constant PoA was proven by Chauhan et al. [15] for a version
with non-uniform edge prices. In contrast, non-constant lower bounds on the PoA have been
proven for local versions of the network creation game by Bilò et al. [10, 12] and Cord-Landwehr
& Lenzner [18].
For other variants and aspects of network creation games, we refer the reader to [2–4, 6–
8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24–26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37].
1.3 Our Contribution
In this paper we introduce a new technique for analyzing stable non-tree networks for high
edge-price α and use it to improve on the current best lower bound for α for which all stable
networks must be trees. In particular, we prove that for α > 4n − 13 any stable network must
be a tree (see Section 2). This is a significant improvement over the known bound of α > 65n by
Mamageishvili et al. [35] and the recently claimed bound of α > 17n by Àlvarez & Messegué [5].
Since the price of anarchy for stable tree networks is constant [23], our bound directly implies a
constant price of anarchy for α > 4n−13. Moreover, in Section 3, we also give a refined analysis
of the price of anarchy of stable tree networks and thereby improve the best known constant
upper bound for stable trees.
Thus, we make significant progress towards settling the tree conjecture in network creation
games and we enlarge the range of α for which the price of anarchy is provably constant.
Our new technique exploits properties of cycles in stable networks by focusing on critical
pairs, strong critical pairs andmin cycles. The latter have been introduced in our earlier work [34]
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and are also used in the preprint by Àlvarez & Messegué [5]. However, in contrast to the
last attempts for settling the tree conjecture [5, 35, 38], we do not rely on the average degree
technique. Instead we propose a more direct and entirely structural approach using (strong)
critical pairs in combination with min cycles. Besides giving better bounds with a simpler
technique, we believe that this approach is better suited for finally resolving the tree conjecture.
2 Improving the Range of α of the Tree Conjecture
In this section we prove our main result, that is, we show that for α > 4n−13, every NE network
(G,α) with n ≥ 4 nodes must be a tree.
We proceed by first establishing properties of cycles in stable networks. Then we introduce
the key concepts called critical pairs, strong critical pairs and min cycles. Finally, we provide
the last ingredient, which is a critical pair with a specific additional property, and combine all
ingredients to obtain the claimed result.
2.1 Properties of Cycles in Stable Networks
We begin by showing that for large values of α, stable networks cannot contain cycles of length
either 3 or 4.
Lemma 1. For α > n−12 , no stable network (G,α) contains a cycle of length 3.
Proof. Let (G,α) be a stable network for a fixed value of α > n−12 . For the sake of contradiction,
assume that G contains a cycle C of length 3. Assume that V (C) = {u0, u1, u2} and that
C contains the three edges (u0, u1), (u1, u2), and (u2, u0). Let Vi =
{
x ∈ V | dG(ui, x) <
dG(uj , x),∀j 6= i
}
. Observe that, for every i ∈ {0, 1, 2} we have |Vi| ≥ 1, as ui ∈ Vi. Furthermore,
all the Vi’s are pairwise disjoint. W.l.o.g., assume that |V0| = max
{|V0|, |V1|, |V2|}. Furthermore,
w.l.o.g., assume that u1 buys the edge (u1, u2). Consider the strategy change in which agent u1
deletes the edge (u1, u2). The building cost of the agent decreases by α while her distance cost
increases by at most |V2|. Since |V2| ≤ |V0|, from |V0| + |V1| + |V2| ≤ n we obtain |V2| ≤ n−12 .
Since G is stable, n−12 − α ≥ 0, i.e., α ≤ n−12 , a contradiction.
Lemma 2. For α > n− 2, no stable network (G,α) contains a cycle of length 4.
Proof. Let (G,α) be a stable network for a fixed value of α > n−2. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that G contains a cycle C of length 4. Assume that V (C) = {u0, u1, u2, u3} and that
C contains the four edges (u0, u1), (u1, u2), (u2, u3), and (u3, u0). For the rest of this proof, we
assume that all indices are modulo 4 in order to simplify notation. Let Vi =
{
x ∈ V | dG(ui, x) <
dG(uj , x),∀j 6= i
}
. Observe that for every i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} we have |Vi| ≥ 1, as ui ∈ Vi. Let
Zi =
{
x ∈ V | dG(ui, x) = dG(ui−1, x) and dG(ui, x), dG(ui−1, x) < dG(uj , x), ∀j 6= i, i − 1
}
.
Observe that in the families of the sets Vi and Zi every pair of sets is pairwise disjoint.
We now rule out the case in which an agent owns two edges of C. W.l.o.g., assume that agent
u0 owns the two edges (u0, u1) and (u0, u3). Consider the strategy change in which agent u0
swaps2 the edge (u0, u1) with the edge (u0, u2) and, at the same time, deletes the edge (u0, u3).
The creation cost of agent u0 decreases by α, while her distance cost increases by |V1|+|V3|−|V2|.
Since (G,α) is stable, agent u0 has no incentive in deviating from her current strategy. Therefore,
|V1| + |V3| − |V2| − α ≥ 0, i.e., α ≤ |V1| + |V3| − |V2| ≤ n − |V0| − |V2| − |V2| ≤ n − 3, where
the last but one inequality follows from the pairwise disjointness of all Vi sets, which implies
|V0|+ |V1|+ |V2|+ |V3| ≤ n. Since, α > n− 2, no agent can own two edges of C. Therefore, to
prove the claim, we need to show that no agent can own a single edge of C.
2A swap of edge (a, b) to edge (a, c) by agent a who owns edge (a, b) consists of deleting edge (a, b) and buying
edge (a, c).
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W.l.o.g., assume that for every i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} agent ui owns the edge (ui, ui+1). Moreover,
w.l.o.g., assume that |V1| + |Z2| = min0≤i≤3
{|Vi| + |Zi+1|}. Since ∑0≤i≤3 (|Vi| + |Zi+1|) ≤ n,
we have that |V1|+ |Z2| ≤ n4 .
Consider the strategy change in which agent u0 deletes the edge (u0, u1). The creation cost
of agent u0 decreases by α, while her distance cost increases by 2|V1|+ |Z2| ≤ n2 .
Since (G,α) is stable, agent u0 has no incentive to deviate from her current strategy. There-
fore, n2 − α ≥ 0, i.e., α ≤ n2 ≤ n− 2, when n ≥ 4. We have obtained a contradiction.
Definition 3 (Directed Cycle). Let C be a cycle of (G,α) of length k. We say that C is
directed if there is an ordering u0, . . . , uk−1 of its k vertices such that, for every i = 0, . . . , k−1,
(ui, u(i+1) mod k) is an edge of C which is bought by agent ui.
We now show that if α is large enough, then directed cycles cannot be contained in a stable
network as a biconnected component.
Lemma 4. For α > n− 2, no stable network (G,α) with n ≥ 6 vertices contains a biconnected
component which is also a directed cycle.
Proof. Let (G,α) be a stable network for a fixed value of α > n − 2. Let H be a biconnected
component of G. For the sake of contradiction, assume that H is a directed cycle of length k.
We can apply Lemma 2 to exclude the case in which k = 4. Similarly, since α > n − 2 ≥ n−12
for every n ≥ 3, we can use Lemma 1 to exclude the case in which k = 3.
Let u0, . . . , uk−1 be the k vertices of H and, w.l.o.g., assume that every agent ui is buying
an edge towards agent u(i+1) mod k. To simplify notation, in the rest of this proof we assume
that all indices are modulo k. Let Vi =
{
x ∈ V | dG(ui, x) < dG(uj , x), ∀j 6= i
}
. Observe that
Vi is a partition of V . We divide the proof into two cases.
The first case occurs when H is a cycle of length k ≥ 6. W.l.o.g., assume that |V2| =
max0≤i≤k−1 |Vi|. In this case, consider the strategy change of agent u0 when she swaps the edge
(u0, u1) with the edge (u0, u2). The distance cost of agent u0 increases by |V1|−|V2|−|V3| ≤ −1.
Thus, agent u0 has an improving strategy, a contradiction.
The second and last case occurs when H is a cycle of length k = 5. If |Vi| 6= |Vj | for some
i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, then there exists an i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} such that |Vi| < |Vi+1|. W.l.o.g., let
|V1| < |V2|. The distance cost of agent u0 when she swaps the edge (u0, u1) with the edge
(u0, u2) increases by |V1|− |V2| ≤ −1. Thus agent u0 has an improving strategy, a contradiction.
If |V0| = |V1| = |V2| = |V3| = |V4|, then the increase in the overall cost incurred by agent u0
when she deletes the edge (u0, u1) would be equal to 3|V1|+ |V2|−α = 45n−α. Since G is stable
and n is a multiple of 5, 45n−α ≥ 0, i.e., α ≤ 45n ≤ n− 2, for every n ≥ 10, a contradiction.
2.2 Critical Pairs
The next definition introduces the concept of a (strong) critical pair. As we will see, (strong)
critical pairs are the first key ingredient for our analysis. Essentially, we will show that stable
networks cannot have critical pairs, if α is large enough.
Definition 5 (Critical Pair). Let (G,α) be a non-tree network and let H be a biconnected
component of G. We say that 〈v, u〉 is a critical pair if all of the following five properties hold:
1. Agent v ∈ V (H) buys two distinct non-bridge edges, say (v, v1) and (v, v2), with v1, v2 ∈
V (H);
2. Agent u ∈ V (H), with u 6= v buys at least one edge (u, u′) with u′ ∈ V (H) and u′ 6= v;
3. dG(v, u) ≥ 2;
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4. there is a shortest path between v and u in G which uses the edge (v, v1);
5. there is a shortest path between v and u′ in G which does not use the edge (u, u′).
The critical pair 〈v, u〉 is strong if there is a shortest path between u and v2 which does not use
the edge (v, v2). See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
H H
H
v
v1
v2
u
u′
v
v1
v2
u
u′
= dG(v, u)
= dG(v, u
′) = dG(v, u)
= dG(v, u
′)
v
v1
v2
u
u′
= dG(v, u)
= dG(v, u
′)
= dG(u, v2)
Figure 1: Illustrations of a critical pair 〈v, u〉. Edge-ownership is depicted by directing edges
away from their owner. Left: Edge (u, u′) belongs to a shortest path tree T rooted at v and
u′ is the parent of u in T . Middle: Edge (u, u′) does not belong to any shortest path tree T
rooted at v. Note that in this case (v, v2) can also be on the shortest path from v to u′. Right:
Illustration of a strong critical pair 〈v, u〉.
In the rest of this section, when we say that two vertices v and u of G form a critical pair, we
will denote by v1, v2, and u′ the vertices corresponding to the critical pair 〈v, u〉 that satisfy all
the conditions given in Definition 5. We can observe the following.
Observation 6. If 〈v, u〉 is a critical pair of a network (G,α), then there exists a shortest path
tree T of G rooted at v, where either the edge (u, u′) is not an edge of T or u′ is the parent of u
in T .
Observation 7. If 〈v, u〉 is a critical pair, then for every shortest path tree T of (G,α) rooted
at u, either the edge (v, v1) is not an edge of T or v1 is the parent of v in T . Furthermore, if
〈v, u〉 is a strong critical pair, then there is a shortest path tree of G rooted at u such that the
edge (v, v2) is not contained in the shortest path tree.
The next technical lemma provides useful bounds on the distance cost of the nodes involved in
a critical pair.
Lemma 8. Let (G,α) be a stable network and let a, b be two distinct vertices of G such that
a buys an edge (a, a′), with a′ 6= b. If dG(a, b) ≥ 2 and there exists a shortest path tree T of
G rooted at b such that either (a, a′) is not an edge of T or a′ is the parent of a in T , then
distcost(a) ≤ distcost(b) + n − 3. Furthermore, if a is buying also the edge (a, a′′), with
a′′ 6= a′, a′′ 6= b, and (a, a′′) is not an edge of T , then distcost(a) ≤ distcost(b) + n− 3− α.
Proof. Consider the strategy change in which agent a swaps the edge (a, a′) with the edge (a, b)
and deletes any other edge she owns and which is not contained in T , if any. Let T ′ be a shortest
path tree rooted at b of the graph obtained after the swap. Observe that dT ′(b, x) ≤ dG(b, x), for
every x ∈ V . Furthermore, as dG(a, b) ≥ 2, while dT ′(a, b) = 1, we have dT ′(a, b) ≤ dG(a, b)− 1.
Therefore,
∑
x∈V dT ′(b, x) ≤ distcost(b)− 1. Moreover, the distance from a to every x 6= a is
at most 1 + dT ′(b, x). Finally, the distance from a to herself, which is clearly 0, is exactly 1 less
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than the distance from b to a in T ′. Therefore the distance cost of a in T ′ is less than or equal
to distcost(b)− 1 + (n− 1)− 1 = distcost(b) + n− 3.
If besides performing the mentioned swap agent a additionally saves at least α in cost by
deleting at least one additional edge which is not in T , then distcost(a) ≤ distcost(b) + n−
3 − α. This is true since G is stable, which implies that the overall cost of a in G cannot be
larger than the overall cost of a after the strategy change.
Now we employ Lemma 8 to prove the structural property that stable networks cannot contain
strong critical pairs if α is large enough.
Lemma 9. For α > 2n− 6, no stable network (G,α) contains a strong critical pair.
Proof. Let (G,α) be a non-tree stable network for a fixed value of α > 2n− 6 and, for the sake
of contradiction, let 〈v, u〉 be a strong critical pair. Using Observation 6 together with Lemma 8
(where a = u, a′ = u′, and b = v), we have that
distcost(u) ≤ distcost(v) + n− 3.
Furthermore, using Observation 7 together with Lemma 8 (where a = v, a′ = v1, a′′ = v2, and
b = u), we have that
distcost(v) ≤ distcost(u) + n− 3− α.
By summing up both the left-hand and the right-hand side of the two inequalities we obtain
0 ≤ 2n− 6− α, i.e., α ≤ 2n− 6, a contradiction.
2.3 Min Cycles
We now introduce the second key ingredient for our analysis: min cycles.
Definition 10 (Min Cycle). Let (G,α) be a non-tree network and let C be a cycle in G. We
say that C is a min cycle if, for every two vertices x, x′ ∈ V (C), dC(x, x′) = dG(x, x′).
First, we show that every edge of every biconnected graph is contained in some min cycle. This
was also proven in [34] and [5].
Lemma 11. Let H be a biconnected graph. Then, for every edge e of H, there is a min cycle
that contains the edge e.
Proof. Since H is biconnected, there exists at least a cycle containing the edge e. Among all the
cycles in H that contain the edge e, let C be a cycle of minimum length. We claim that C is a
min cycle. For the sake of contradiction, assume that C is not a min cycle. This implies that
there are two vertices x, y ∈ V (C) such that dH(x, y) < dC(x, y). Among all pairs x, y ∈ V (C)
of vertices such that dH(x, y) < dC(x, y), let x′, y′ be the one that minimizes the value dH(x′, y′)
(ties are broken arbitrarily). Let Π be a shortest path between x′ and y′ in G. By the choice
of x′ and y′, Π is edge disjoint from C. Let P and P ′ be the two edge-disjoint paths between
x′ and y′ in C and, w.l.o.g., assume that e is contained in P . Let ` and `′ be the length of P
and P ′, respectively. See Fig. 2. Clearly, the length of C is equal to `+ `′. Since dC(x′, y′) ≤ `′,
we obtain dH(x′, y′) < `′. Therefore, the cycle obtained by concatenating P and Π has a length
equal to `+ dH(x′, y′) < `+ `′, and therefore, it is strictly shorter than C, a contradiction.
Now we proceed with showing that stable networks contain only min cycles which are directed
and not too short. For this, we employ our knowledge about strong critical pairs.
Lemma 12. For α > 2n − 6, every min cycle of a non-tree stable network (G,α) with n ≥ 4
vertices is directed and has a length of at least 5.
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eΠ
P ′
P
length = `
length = `′
length < `′
Figure 2: The cycle C containing edge e and the paths P, P ′ and Π.
Proof. Let (G,α) be a non-tree stable network for a fixed α > 2n− 6 and let C be a min cycle
of G. Since 2n− 6 ≥ n−12 for every n ≥ 4, using Lemma 1, we have that C cannot be a cycle of
length equal to 3. Furthermore, Since 2n− 6 ≥ n− 2 for every n ≥ 4, using Lemma 2, we have
that C cannot be either a cycle of length equal to 4. Therefore, C is a cycle of length greater
than or equal to 5.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that C is not directed. This means that C contains a
agent, say v, that is buying both her incident edges in C. We prove the contradiction thanks to
Lemma 9, by showing that C contains a strong critical pair.
If C is an odd-length cycle, then v has two distinct antipodal vertices u, u′ ∈ V (C) which are
also adjacent in C.3 W.l.o.g., assume that u is buying the edge towards u′. Clearly, dG(v, u) ≥ 2.
Furthermore, since C is a min cycle, it is easy to check that 〈v, u〉 is a strong critical pair.
If C is an even-length cycle, then let u ∈ V (C) be the (unique) antipodal vertex of v and let
u′ be a vertex that is adjacent to u in C. Observe that dG(v, u), dG(v, u′) ≥ 2. Again using the
fact that C is a min cycle, we have the following:
• If u is buying the edge towards u′, then 〈v, u〉 is a strong critical pair.
• If u′ is buying the edge towards u, then 〈v, u′〉 is a strong critical pair.
In both cases, we have proved that C contains a strong critical pair.
Let (G,α) be a non-tree stable network with n ≥ 6 vertices for a fixed α > 2n − 6 and let H
be a biconnected component of G. Since 2n− 6 ≥ n− 2 for every n ≥ 4, Lemma 4 implies that
H cannot be a directed cycle. At the same time, if H is a cycle, then it is also a min cycle and
therefore, Lemma 12 implies that H must be directed, which contradicts Lemma 4. Therefore,
we have proved the following.
Corollary 13. For α > 2n− 6, no non-tree stable network (G,α) with n ≥ 6 vertices contains
a cycle as one of its biconnected components.
2.4 Combining the Ingredients
Towards our main result, we start with proving that every stable network must contain a critical
pair which satisfies an interesting structural property. This lemma is the third and last ingredient
that is used in our analysis.
Lemma 14. For α > 2n− 6, every non-tree stable network (G,α) with n ≥ 6 vertices contains
a critical pair 〈v, u〉. Furthermore, there exists a path P between v and v2 in G such that (a) the
length of P is at most 2dG(u, v) and (b) P uses none of the edges (v, v1) and (v, v2).
3In a cycle of length `, two vertices of the cycles are antipodal if their distance is equal to b`/2c.
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Proof. Let (G,α) be a network of n ≥ 6 vertices which is stable for a fixed α > 2n− 6, and let
H be any biconnected component of G. By Corollary 13, we have that H cannot be a cycle. As
a consequence, H contains at least |V (H)|+ 1 edges and, therefore, it has a vertex, say v, that
buys at least two edges of H.
Let v1 and v2 be the two distinct vertices of H such that v buys the edges (v, v1) and
(v, v2). Let Ci be the min cycle that contains the edge (v, vi), whose existence is guaranteed by
Lemma 11. Lemma 12 implies that Ci is a directed cycle of length greater than or equal to 5.
Therefore, since (v, v1) is an edge of C1 bought by agent v, C1 cannot contain the edge (v, v2),
which is also bought by v. Similarly, since (v, v2) is an edge of C2 bought by agent v, C2 cannot
contain the edge (v, v1), which is also bought by v.
Let T be a shortest path tree rooted at v which gives priority to the shortest paths using
the edges (v, v1) or (v, v2). More precisely, for every vertex x, if there is a shortest path from v
to x containing the edge (v, v1), then x is a descendant of v1 in T . Furthermore, if no shortest
path from v to x contains the edge (v, v1), but there is a shortest path from v to x containing
the edge (v, v2), then x is a descendant of v2 in T .
Consider the directed version of Ci in which each edge is directed from their owner agent
towards the other end vertex. Let ui be, among the vertices of Ci which are also descendants of
vi in T , the one which is in maximum distance from v w.r.t. the directed version of Ci. Finally,
let (ui, u′i) be the edge of Ci which is bought by agent ui. Clearly, u
′
i is not a descendant of vi
in T . Therefore, by construction of T , dG(v, u′i) ≤ dG(v, ui), otherwise u′i would have been a
descendant of vi in T , or there would have been a min cycle containing both edges (v, v1) and
(v, v2) (which are both bought by agent v), thus contradicting Lemma 12.
W.l.o.g., assume that dG(v, u2) ≤ dG(v, u1). Let u = u1 and u′ = u′1. We show that 〈v, u〉
is a critical pair. By Lemma 12, C1 is a cycle of length k ≥ 5. As C1 is a min cycle, k =
dG(v, u) + 1 + dG(v, u
′). Moreover, since dG(v, u′) ≤ dG(v, u), we have that dG(v, u) ≥ k−12 ≥ 2.
Therefore u′ 6= v. Next, the shortest path in T between v and u uses the edge (v, v1) which is
owned by agent v. Furthermore, the shortest path in T between v and u′ does not use the edge
(u, u′). Therefore, 〈v, u〉 is a critical pair.
Now, consider the path P which is obtained from C2 by removing the edge (v, v2). Recalling
that C2 does not contain the edge (v, v1), it follows that P is a path between v and v2 which
uses none of the two edges (v, v1) and (v, v2). Therefore, recalling that dG(v, u′2) ≤ dG(v, u2),
the overall length of P is less than or equal to
dG(v, u
′
2) + 1 + dG(v2, u2) ≤ dG(v, u2) + 1 + dG(v, u2)− 1 ≤ 2dG(v, u1) = 2dG(v, u).
Finally, we prove our main result. For this and in the rest of the paper, given a vertex x of a
network (G,α) and a subset U of vertices of G, we denote by dG(x, U) :=
∑
x′∈U dG(x, x
′).
Theorem 15. For α > 4n− 13, every stable network (G,α) with n ≥ 4 vertices is a tree.
Proof. First of all, it is easy to check that for α > 3 every stable network with n = 4 vertices is
a tree. Moreover, the same holds true for n = 5 for α > 7.
Let α > 4n−13 be a fixed value and let (G,α) be a stable network with n ≥ 6 vertices. Since
4n − 13 ≥ 2n − 6, for every n ≥ 4, we have that if (G,α) is not a tree, then, by Lemma 14, it
contains a critical pair 〈v, u〉 satisfying the conditions stated in Lemma 14. Moreover, Lemma 9
implies that 〈v, u〉 cannot be a strong critical pair. As a consequence, every shortest path from
u to v2 uses the edge (v, v2). Since 〈v, u〉 is a critical pair, this implies that there is a shortest
path from u to v2 which uses both the edges (v1, v) and (v, v2). To finish our proof, we show
that this contradicts the assumed stability of (G,α). This implies that (G,α) must be a tree.
Let T (u) be a shortest path tree of G rooted at u having v1 as the parent of v and v as the
parent of v2. Observe that, by definition of a critical pair, there is a shortest path between v
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and u containing the edge (v, v1). Therefore, T (u) is well defined. Furthermore, let X be the
set of vertices which are descendants of v2 in T (u). Note that since v2 ∈ X, we have |X| ≥ 1.
Since 〈v, u〉 is a critical pair, thanks to Observation 6, we can use Lemma 8 (where a =
u, a′ = u′, and b = v) to obtain
distcost(u) ≤ distcost(v) + n− 3. (1)
Furthermore, observe that
distcost(u) =
∑
x∈X
(
dG(u, v) + dG(v, x)
)
+ dG(u, V \X) (2)
= dG(u, v)|X|+ dG(v,X) + dG(u, V \X).
Therefore, by substituting distcost(u) in (1) with (2) we obtain the following
dG(u, v)|X|+ dG(v,X) + dG(u, V \X) ≤ distcost(v) + n− 3. (3)
Let T ′(u) be the tree obtained from T (u) by the the swap of the edge (v, v1) with the edge (v, u).
The distance cost incurred by agent v if she swaps the edge (v, v1) with the edge (v, u) is at most
dT ′(u)(v, V ) = dT ′(u)(v,X) + dT ′(u)(v, V \X) = dT (u)(v,X) + dT ′(u)(v, V \X)
≤ dT (u)(v,X) +
∑
x∈V \(X∪{v})
(
1 + dT (u)(u, x)
)
≤ dG(v,X) +
∑
x∈V \X
(
1 + dG(u, x)
)− 2
= dG(v,X) + n− |X|+ dG(u, V \X)− 2.
Since (G,α) is stable, agent v cannot decrease her distance cost by swapping any of the edges
she owns. Therefore, we obtain
distcost(v) ≤ dG(v,X) + n− |X|+ dG(u, V \X)− 2. (4)
By summing both the left-hand and the right-hand sides of the two inequalities (3) to (4) and
simplifying we obtain
dG(u, v)|X| ≤ 2n− 5− |X|. (5)
Consider the network (G′, α) induced by the strategy vector in which agent v deviates from her
current strategy by swapping the edge (v, v1) with the edge (v, u) and, at the same time, by
deleting the edge(v, v2). By Lemma 14, there exists a path P between v and v2 in G, of length
at most 2dG(u, v), such that P uses none of the edges (v, v1) and (v, v2). As a consequence,
using both (1) and (5) in the second to last inequality of the following chain, the distance cost
of v w.r.t. (G′, α) is upper bounded by
dG′(v, V ) ≤
∑
x∈X
(
2dG(u, v) + dG(v2, x)
)
+
∑
x∈V \(X∪{v})
(
1 + dG(u, x)
)
≤ 2dG(u, v)|X|+ dG(v2, X) + n− |X|+ dG(u, V \X)− 2
≤ 2dG(u, v)|X|+ dG(v,X)− |X|+ n− |X|+ dG(u, V \X)− 2
= 2dG(u, v)|X|+ dG(u,X)− dG(u, v)|X|+ n− 2|X|+ dG(u, V \X)− 2
= dG(u, v)|X|+ n− 2|X|+ distcost(u)− 2
≤ 2n− 5− |X|+ n− 2|X|+ distcost(v) + n− 3− 2
= distcost(v) + 4n− 10− 3|X| ≤ distcost(v) + 4n− 13.
By her strategy change, agent v will save α in edge cost and her distance cost will increase by
at most 4n− 13. Thus, if α > 4n− 13, then this yields a strict cost decrease for agent v which
contradicts the stability of (G,α).
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With the results from Fabrikant et al. [23] Theorem 15 yields:
Corollary 16. For α > 4n− 13 the PoA is at most 5.
In Section 3 we improve the upper bound of 5 on the PoA for stable tree networks from Fabrikant
et al. [23]. With this, we establish the following:
Corollary 17. For every α > 4n− 13 the PoA is at most 3 + 2n2n+α .
3 Improved Price of Anarchy for Stable Tree Networks
In this section we show a better bound on the PoA of stable tree networks. To prove the bound,
we need to introduce some new notation first. Let T be a tree on n vertices and, for a vertex v
of T , let T − v be the forest obtained by removing vertex v together with all its incident edges
from T . We say that v is a centroid of T if every tree in T − v has at most n/2 vertices. It is
well known that every tree has at least one centroid vertex [27].
Lemma 18. Let (T, α) be a stable tree network rooted at a centroid c of T , and let u, v ∈ V (T ),
with u, v 6= c, be two vertices such that u buys the edge towards v in T . Then dT (c, u) < dT (c, v),
i.e. u is the parent of v in T . Furthermore, if T denotes the subtree of T rooted at v, then v is
a centroid of T .
Proof. We show that dT (c, u) < dT (c, v) by proving that if dT (c, u) > dT (c, v), then (T, α) is
not stable. So, assume that dT (c, u) > dT (c, v). Consider the forest obtained from T after the
removal of the edge (u, v) and let Tv be the tree of the forest that contains vertex v. Since v is
closer to c than u in T and u is not a vertex of Tv, it follows that c is a vertex of Tv. Consider
the strategy change in which player u swaps the edge (u, v) with the edge (u, c). Since u and v
are both in the same tree, say T ′′, of the forest T − c, it follows that the tree induced by all the
vertices of T which are not contained in T ′′, say T ′, is entirely contained in Tv and has n′ ≥ n/2
vertices, as c is a centroid of T . Observe that after the swap of the edge (u, v) with the edge
(u, c), the distance from each of the vertices in T ′ decreases by dT (v, c), while the distance from
each of all the other vertices of Tv increases by at most dT (v, c). Therefore, if we denote by nv
the number of vertices of Tv, then the usage cost of player u increases by at most
dT (v, c)(nv − n′)− dT (v, c)n′ = dT (v, c)(nv − 2n′) ≤ dT (v, c)(n− 1− 2n/2) ≤ −1.
Therefore, (T, α) is not stable.
We now prove that v is a centroid of T . Let V be the set of vertices of T . Observe that the
claim trivially holds if |V | ≤ 2. Therefore, we assume that |V | ≥ 3. Notice that
distcost(u) = dT (u, V ) + dT (u, V \ V ) = |V |+ dT (v, V ) + dT (u, V \ V ).
Since (T, α) is stable, dT (v, V ) = minv′∈V dT (v
′, V ), otherwise u would have incentive to change
her strategy by swapping the edge (u, v) with the edge (u, v∗) such that v∗ ∈ arg minv′∈V dT (v′, V ).
Let x1, . . . , xk be the k neighbors of v in T . Clearly, x1, . . . , xk are also the k children of v
in T . Let (v, xi) be any edge of T adjacent to v. Consider the forest F obtained by removing
the edge (v, xi) from T . Let Xi be the set of vertices of the tree of F that contains xi. Let
Yi = V \Xi be the set of vertices of the tree of F that contains v. We have that
dT (v, V ) = dT (v, Yi) + dT (v,Xi) = dT (v, Yi) + |Xi|+ dT (xi, Xi).
Similarly,
dT (xi, V ) = dT (xi, Yi) + dT (xi, Xi) = |Yi|+ dT (v, Yi) + dT (xi, Xi).
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Since dT (v, V ) ≤ dT (xi, V ), it follows that
dT (v, Yi) + |Xi|+ dT (xi, Xi) ≤ |Yi|+ dT (v, Yi) + dT (xi, Xi), i.e., |Xi| ≤ |Yi|.
Therefore, for every i = 1, . . . , k, we have that |Xi| ≤ 1 +
∑k
j=1,j 6=i |Xj | = |V | − |Xi|, which
implies that |Xi| ≤ |V |/2. Hence, v is a centroid of T .
We now show a useful bound on the number of vertices contained in each of the subtrees of a
stable tree network rooted at a centroid.
Lemma 19. Let (T, α) be a stable tree network rooted at a centroid c of T , let u be a child of
c in T and let v be a leaf of T contained in the subtree of T rooted at u. Let c1, . . . , ck be the
vertices along the path in T between c0 = u and ck = v, where ci+1 is the child of ci, and, finally,
for every i = 1, . . . , k, let
ni =
∣∣{x ∈ V | dT (ci, x) < dT (cj , x), j 6= i}∣∣.
We have that
∑i
j=1 nj ≥ n ·
∑i
j=1 1/2
j.
Proof. The proof is by induction on i.
The base is when i = 1. Observe that {x ∈ V | dT (c, x) < dT (cj , x), j ∈ {1, . . . , k}} ⊂ {x ∈
V | dT (c1, x) < dT (cj , x), j ∈ {2, . . . , k}}. Therefore, since c is a centroid, n1 ≥ n/2.
Now, assume that for every j ≤ i, nj ≥ n/2j . We prove the claim for i+1. Using Lemma 18,
we have that ci+1 is a centroid of the subtree of T rooted at ci+1. As a consequence, if m =∑i
j=1 nj , we have that ni+1 ≥ n−m2 . By induction hypothesis, m ≥ n ·
∑i
j=1 1/2
j . Therefore,
i+1∑
j=1
nj = m+ ni+1 ≥ m+ n−m
2
=
m+ n
2
≥ n ·
i∑
j=1
1/2j+1 +
n
2
= n ·
i+1∑
j=1
1
2j
.
We can finally prove our upper bound on the PoA of stable tree networks.
Theorem 20. For α ≥ 2, the PoA restricted to the class of stable tree networks of n vertices is
upper bounded by 3 + 2n
2−8n−4α
2n2+(α−2)n .
Proof. Let (T, α) be a stable tree network rooted at a centroid c of T . Let c′ be any child of c
in T and let v be any leaf contained in the subtree of T rooted at c′. Let c1, . . . , cr+2 be the
vertices along the path in T between c1 = c′ and cr+2 = v, where ci+1 is the child of ci, and,
finally, for every i = 1, . . . , r + 2, let
ni =
∣∣{x ∈ V | dT (ci, x) < dT (cj , x), j 6= i}∣∣.
Consider the strategy change in which player v buys the edge (v, c1) and let k = br/2c. The
creation cost of player v clearly increases by α, while her distance cost decreases by at least∑k
i=1
(
(r+ 2− 2i)ni
)
. Since, r+ 2− 2i is strictly positive and monotonically decreasing w.r.t. i,
using Lemma 19 we can observe that the distance cost of player v is minimized when, for every
i = 1, . . . , k, nr−i is minimum, i.e., when nr−i ≥ n2i . Therefore, the distance cost decrease of v
is lower bounded by
k∑
i=1
(
(r + 2− 2i)ni
) ≥ k∑
i=1
(
(r + 2− 2i)n/2i) = (r + 2)n k∑
i=1
1
2i
− 2n
k∑
i=1
i
2i
= (r + 2)n
(
1− 1
2k
)
− 2n
(
k/2k+2 − (k + 1)/2k+1 + 1/2
(1/2− 1)2
)
= (r + 2)n− r + 2
2k
n− 2k
2k
n+
4(k + 1)
2k
n− 4n
= (r − 2)n+ n
(
2k + 2− r
2k
)
≥ (r − 2)n,
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where last inequality holds because r ≤ 2k + 1.
Since (T, α) is stable, player v has no incentive to buy the edge (v, c1). Hence, α−(r−2)n ≥ 0,
i.e., r ≤ α/n+2. This implies that the length of the path from the centroid to any leaf of T is at
most α/n+ 4. Thus, the diameter of T is less than or equal to 2α/n+ 8. Since in every tree of n
vertices, there are 2(n− 1) distinct pair of vertices at distance 1, while the other (n− 1)(n− 2)
pairs are at distance of at most 2α/n+ 8, the upper bound on the social cost of T is
cost(T ) = α(n− 1) +
(
2α
n
+ 8
)
(n− 1)(n− 2) + 2(n− 1)
=
8n2 + (3α− 14)n− 4α
n
· (n− 1).
The cost of the social optimum on n nodes, which for α ≥ 2 is the star [23], is
cost(Sn) = α(n− 1) + 2(n− 1)(n− 2) + 2(n− 1) =
(
2n+ α− 2)(n− 1).
Therefore,
cost(T )
cost(Sn)
=
8n2 + (3α− 14)n− 4α
2n2 + (α− 2)n = 3 +
2n2 − 8n− 4α
2n2 + (α− 2)n.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have opened a new line of attack on settling the tree conjecture and on proving
a constant price of anarchy for the network creation game for all α. Our technique is orthogonal
to the known approaches using bounds on the average degree of vertices in a biconnected com-
ponent. We are confident that our methods can be refined and/or combined with the average
degree technique to obtain even better bounds – ideally proving or disproving the conjectures.
Another interesting approach is to modify our techniques to cope with the so-called max-
version of the network creation game [21], where agents try to minimize their maximum distance
to all other nodes, instead of minimizing the sum of distances. Also for the max-version it is
still open for which α all stable networks must be trees.
Acknowledgement: We thank our anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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